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The intense reception of Carl Schmitt’s writings among Chinese constitutional theorists is one 
of the more striking phenomena within the globalization of constitutional thought in recent 
decades. This paper approaches it from two angles. Firstly, the reception of Schmitt and the 
subsequent debates about his oeuvre and persona are interpreted as performative practices in 
which Schmitt soon emerged as both the bête noire of a liberal-leaning constitutional 
scholarship and an object of romantic projection for avant-garde theoretical endeavors. 
Engagement with Schmitt thus crucially contributed to the emergence of both a neo-
conservative and a critical-liberal sensibility among Chinese legal scholars. Secondly, with the 
rise of what is known in China as Political Constitutionalism in the mid-2000s, Schmitt also 
began to exert a more substantive terminological and conceptual influence on Chinese 
constitutional theory more generally, leaving his imprint on some of its fundamental theoretical 
binaries. Looking at the Chinese debate on Schmitt, therefore, not only grants us a unique 
glimpse into how constitutional debates are structured and evolving in contemporary China, it 
also demonstrates the often-unexpected trajectories of conceptual migration in the global age. 
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I. Introduction: Carl Schmitt’s unexpected rise to fame in China  
There was a time after World War Two when things appeared to be deadly silent around Carl 
Schmitt – that is a time when he was personally discredited and academically marginalized. 
Once one of the rising stars of the Weimar Germany intellectual scene – urban bohemian and 
catholic fatalist, erudite and polyglot, a talented polemicist and a political opportunist – his 
infamous endorsement of the Nazi take-over and subsequent efforts to cater to the regime’s elite 
had ended in a disgraceful way. Not only did he, despite his best efforts at vindicating the 
regime, fall from grace within the Nazi establishment – his academic career in post-War Europe 
was shattered due to his despicable political affiliations and his unwillingness to distance 
himself from his previous deeds. Henceforth, he spent his life in his small house in rural West 
Germany and found intellectual refuge in Franco’s Spain. Academically, he remained an outlaw, 
producing grand historical tales of the expansion of European legal civilization and nostalgic 
contemplations on its subsequent demise.1 Notable exceptions include his tacit yet sustained 
influence on German post-war constitutional thought and parts of the European New Left.2  
As is well known, things have changed dramatically since then and the reappearance of 
Schmitt’s specter on the international academic stage is among the most striking phenomena of 
intellectual globalization in recent decades. Schmitt’s influence on contemporary political 
theory has been widely covered by recent research. 3  However, when a volume on the 
international reception of Schmitt appeared in 2007, China was conspicuously absent.4 This is 
striking, since it was precisely in the People’s Republic (PRC) where Schmitt’s work had 
received considerable interest since the late 1990s and early 2000s. This gap has now partly 
been filled by the publication of another volume on the intellectual reception of Carl Schmitt 
and Leo Strauss in Greater China.5 The Chinese interest in Schmitt can now no longer be 
                                                          
1 C Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum (4th edn, Duncker und Humblot, 
Berlin, 1997). 
2 EW Böckenförde, ‘Der Begriff des Politischen als Schlüssel zum staatsrechtlichen Werk Carl Schmitts‘ in idem, 
Recht, Staat, Freiheit (Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M., 1991) 344. 
3 J Derrida, ‘Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority”’ (1990) 11 Cardozo Law Review 920; G 
Agamben, State of Exception (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2005); generally see M Hirsch, ‘Politische 
Theologie des Konflikts. Carl Schmitt im politischen Denken der Gegenwart‘ in R Voigt (ed), Der Staat des 
Dezisionismus: Carl Schmitt in der internationalen Debatte (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2007) 82. 
4 R Voigt, ‘Carl Schmitt in der Gegenwartsdiskussion’ in idem (ed), Der Staat des Dezisionismus: Carl Schmitt in 
der internationalen Debatte (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2007) 13.  
5 K Marchal and C Shaw, ‘Introduction’ in idem (ed), Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss in the Chinese-Speaking World. 
Reorienting the Political (Lexington, London, 2017) 1; C Shaw, ‘Toward a Radical Critique of Liberalism: Carl 
Schmitt and Leo Strauss in Contemporary Chinese Discourses’ in K Marchal and C Shaw (ed), Carl Schmitt and 
Leo Strauss in the Chinese-Speaking World. Reorienting the Political (Lexington, London, 2017) 37; also see S 
Veg, ‘The Rise of China’s Statist Intellectuals: Law, Sovereignty, and “Repoliticization”’ (2019) 82 The China 




neglected. Back in 1998, Liu Xiaofeng – soon to become the initiator of the Chinese ‘Schmitt 
fever’ – could still rhetorically ask his Chinese peers: ‘Who is Schmitt? The knowledge of this 
figure among Chinese intellectuals is extremely limited.’6 Two decades on, and there are now 
countless scholarly articles in mainland China dealing with Schmitt’s thought. Most works of 
him have been translated into Chinese, including seemingly peripheral writings, such as his 
letters of correspondence with Ernst Jünger. The Chinese publishers Zhongguo Shehui Kexue 
Chubanshe and Shanghai Remin Chubanshe even initiated a series on Schmitt’s work.7 As a 
consequence, Guo Jian would conclude merely eight years after the publication of Liu’s 
foundational essay that, whenever the Chinese ‘are discussing Western thought today, 
particularly political philosophy and jurisprudence, we can hardly ever escape the 
entanglements with Schmitt’s specter.’8  
It is by no means easy to answer, however, what drove the interest, and at times outright 
obsession of Chinese intellectuals with Schmitt’s writings. Likewise, there is no straightforward 
answer as to why Schmitt’s thought became an object of desire for a number of well-known 
constitutional scholars. Besides the undoubtedly justified focus on anti-liberal tendencies in 
Chinese academia and the alleged or real appeal held by Schmitt to such illiberal sentiments, 
the constitutional and legal-theoretical dimensions of Schmitt’s work and their influence on 
China’s constitutional discourse have remained under-explored. It is precisely in this field, 
however, where Schmitt’s impact can be felt most glaringly.9 In the following, I will interpret 
the Chinese reception of Schmitt as a phenomenon of legal globalization and the migration of 
constitutional ideas and concepts. In this regard, at least three related questions call for an 
answer. Firstly, who is reading – and perhaps utilizing – Schmitt; secondly, how is he being 
understood and adopted to Chinese conditions; and, thirdly, why? Of these, the third question 
seems to trouble outside observers most. Why did prominent constitutional scholars in China, 
                                                          
6 X Liu, ‘施米特与自由主义宪政理论的困境’ [‚Schmitt and the Dilemmas of Liberal Constitutional Theory’] 
(1998) 47 Twenty-First Century [二十一世纪] 111. 
7 A list of the titles in this series (卡尔·施米特研究文丛) can be found at <https://book.douban.com/series/26516>. 
8 J Guo, ‘为了打击共同的敌人–施米特及其左派盟友’ [‘In Order to Defeat the Common Enemy – Schmitt and 
his Left-Wing Allies’] (2006) 94 Twenty-First Century [二十一世纪] 19. 
9 See, for instance, C Kroll, ‘Reading the Temperature Curve: Sinophone Schmitt-fever in Context and Perspective’ 
in K Marchal and C Shaw (ed), Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss in the Chinese-Speaking World. Reorienting the 
Political (Lexington, London, 2017) 103; Q Zheng, ‘Chinese Political Constitutionalism and Carl Schmitt’ (2017) 
1 Carl Schmitt Studien 43; X Zhang, ‘Carl Schmitt in China: Why Is He Needed and How Is He Understood? – 
An Analysis of Chinese Political Constitutional Theory’ (2018) 25(2) Zeitschrift für chinesisches Recht 83. While 
my account is indebted to earlier explorations of this topic by the quoted authors, it seeks to present a unique 
perspective on the issue in three regards: firstly, by including the work of Jiang Shigong in the discussion; secondly, 
by showing how the Chinese debate moved from the initial liberal-illiberal-divide concerning Schmitt’s political 
philosophy to a more substantive conceptual controversy with the rise of Political Constitutionalism in the mid-
2000s; and, lastly, by reflecting upon the implications of this phenomenon for the study of legal and constitutional 
globalization more generally. 
 
 
given the vast tradition of modern constitutional thought, choose to seek inspiration precisely 
in Schmitt’s work for their elaboration of an admittedly creative account – and apology – of the 
Chinese party-state? I will attempt to answer these three questions based on three corresponding 
aspects of Schmitt’s work: the concept of the political, the notions of sovereignty and state order 
– including his rejection of judicial review – as well as his distinction between constitution and 
constitutional law. I will then proceed to distinguish three loosely corresponding scholarly 
‘strategies of reception’ which are being interpreted as performative practices of reading 
Schmitt: the anti-liberal or leftist strategy, the statist or neo-conservative strategy, and the 
conceptual or ‘critical-liberal’ strategy. Lastly, I will trace Schmitt’s impact on the work of 
three well-known constitutional theorists: Chen Duanhong, Jiang Shigong, and Gao Quanxi. 
Schmitt’s theoretical oeuvre indeed played a crucial role in the formation of their scholarly 
agenda. However, disagreement over how to adequately assess his legacy also epitomizes the 
wide normative gap between these scholars. This resulted in an intellectual rift that cuts across 
the long-established liberal-illiberal fault line of Chinese constitutional scholarship. As a 
consequence, Schmitt’s work now informs both the neo-conservative agenda of statist 
intellectuals as well as the realist sensibility of some of their liberal critics. 
II. Three aspects of Schmitt’s work… 
Carl Schmitt’s constitutional thought evolved within the specific context of Weimar Germany’s 
constitutional debate which was in turn inseparable from the constitutional crisis of the young 
republic.10 In many ways, Weimar served as an intellectual laboratory of 20th century political 
modernity. It is not too surprising, then, that current processes of constitutional and intellectual 
globalization are still caught within – or might at least be described along the lines of – Weimar-
era conceptual binaries. When looking at the Chinese reception of Schmitt, we therefore ought 
to take into account both this original context as well as its sometimes only loosely 
corresponding context of reception.11 I will attempt to condense three aspects of Schmitt’s work 
that to me seem most relevant for the constitutional-theoretical reception of his thought in China, 
beginning with the concept of the political.  
The relevance of Schmitt’s most well-known work Der Begriff des Politischen, dating from 
1927, has always been contested. While some legal scholars, notably Ernst-Wolfgang 
                                                          
10  Generally see M Gangl, ‘Einleitung. Die Weimarer Staatsrechtsdebatte‘ in M Gangl (ed), Die Weimarer 
Staatsrechtsdebatte. Diskurs- und Rezeptionsstrategien (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2011) 9. 
11 It is in this vein that Kroll speaks of ‘three discursive layers’ of the sinophone discussion on Schmitt. See Kroll 
(n 9) 103. 
 
 
Böckenförde, place it at the center of Schmittian thought,12 others claim that the context of its 
drafting suggests that he developed the essay ‘occasionally for analytical purposes’.13 From a 
systematic perspective, Schmitt’s opus magnum is without any doubt the Verfassungslehre of 
the following year, which incorporates all relevant aspects of his writings of the 1920s. From a 
conceptual point of view, however, one can legitimately argue that both his constitutional 
theory and the concept of sovereignty presuppose the concept of the political. Schmitt famously 
asserts that the foundation of the political is the distinction between friend and enemy. Most 
misunderstandings are based on a vulgarized reading of this, admittedly striking, claim. For 
Schmitt, said distinction is a polemical and descriptive, not a normative, criteria – building on 
a differential mode of thinking characterized by Mark Lilla as ‘distinguo ergo sum’.14 Notably, 
Schmitt does at no point suggest a quasi-ontological need for enmity, but instead conceives of 
the friend-enemy-distinction as a ‘phenomenological’ account of the political process of 
‘building exclusive groups’. 15  His concept of the political, therefore, is not that of an 
‘autonomous field (Sachgebiet), but of a degree of intensity of association and dissociation of 
people’.16  The process of forming a ‘state’, particularly a modern nation-state – which is 
nothing but ‘the political unity of a people’ – involves not only the inclusion of all nationals 
within, but also the exclusion of all non-nationals from this unity. Despite his fervent and 
polemical agitation against liberalism in many of his works,17 it is this rather mundane claim 
which serves as the conceptual foundation of the concepts of state, sovereignty, and constitution.  
As with the concept of the political, Schmitt’s peculiar talent of condensing complex notions 
into concise definitions is also apparent in his infamous definition of sovereignty brought 
forward in the 1922 essay Politische Theologie: ‘Sovereign is he who decides on the state of 
exception.’18 It was often noted by liberal critics that Schmitt appeared to profess an inborn 
inclination to favor the exceptional over the ordinary and normal. I will not dwell on the 
historical context of such right-wing obsessions with the exceptional in modern German 
                                                          
12 EW Böckenförde, ‘Die Entstehung des Staates als Vorgang der Säkularisation‘ in idem, Recht, Staat, Freiheit 
(Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M., 1991) 92. 
13 R Mehring, ‘Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen‘ in M Brocker (ed), Geschichte des politischen Denkens 
(Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M., 2006) 510. 
14 M Lilla, The Reckless Mind. Intellectuals in Politics (New York Review Books, NYC, 2011) 57; also see C 
Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen (9th edn, Duncker und Humblot, Berlin, 2015) 28.  
15 L Strauss, ‘Anmerkungen zu Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen‘ in Heinrich Meier (ed), Carl Schmitt, 
Leo Strauss und Der Begriff des Politischen. Zu einem Dialog unter Abwesenden (Metzler, Stuttgart, 1988) 97, 
132. 
16 Schmitt (n 14) 38. 
17 Mehring (n 13) 515. 
18 C Schmitt, Politische Theologie (10th edn, Duncker und Humblot, Berlin, 2015) 13. 
 
 
intellectual history.19 This peculiar background might, however, explain why he developed his 
notion of sovereignty out of what he calls the ‘state of exception’, i.e. a moment of constitutional 
crisis which allegedly demands decisive action on part of the sovereign: 
There are no norms that are applicable to chaos. Order must be established, so that the legal 
order (Rechtsordnung) can have any sense. A normal situation must be brought about, and 
sovereign is he who definitely decides upon whether this is actually the case.20 
As with the concept of the political, Schmitt does not provide any substantive definition of what 
sovereignty is or ought to be. Instead, he resorts to a formal definition ex negativo, relying on 
the phenomenological distinction between order and suspension, norm and decision. Simply 
look, Schmitt seems to say, at what occurs during the state of exception. This is sovereignty.21  
Closely linked to this definition of sovereignty is the idea of state order. Schmitt maintains that, 
during the state of exception, the state order remains intact whereas the law is being suspended:  
In such a situation, it is clear that the State remains, whereas the law recedes. Since the 
state of exception is still something different from anarchy and chaos, in the juridical 
sense there is still an order, albeit not a legal order. The existence of the State retains 
an undoubtful superiority over the validity of the legal norm.22 
His notion of sovereign state power can be summed up in the quasi-ontological assertion that 
‘no norm […] protects or guards itself; no normative validity can assert itself’.23 This rejection 
of the autonomous self-regulating capacity of modern law also presupposes Schmitt’s rejection 
of judicial review. Against Kelsen, who played a leading role in the introduction of 
constitutional review in post-World War I Austria, Schmitt famously rejected the idea of a 
constitutional court for Weimar Germany and instead advocated a powerful president as the 
political guardian of the constitution.24 This opposition to what might be called judicial or 
normative constitutionalism also plays a key role in his reception in China.25 The two aspects 
dealt with so far are, however, conceptually inter-dependent and cannot be separated from the 
larger framework of the Verfassungslehre of 1928 without distorting their meaning.   
                                                          
19 See H Bredekamp, ‘From Walter Benjamin to Carl Schmitt, via Thomas Hobbes’ (1999) 25(2) Critical Inquiry 
247. 
20 Schmitt (n 18) 19. 
21 Consequently, some have argued that Schmitt’s theory of sovereignty is but a factual description of a successful 
coup d’état. See V Neumann, ‘Theologie als staatsrechtswissenschaftliches Argument: Hans Kelsen und Carl 
Schmitt‘ (2008) 47(2) Der Staat 163.  
22 Schmitt (n 18) 18.  
23 C Schmitt, Legalität und Legitimität (8th edn, Duncker und Humblot, Berlin, 2012) 57. 
24 H Kelsen, ‘Wer soll der Hüter der Verfassung sein?‘ in R Van Ooyen (ed), Wer soll der Hüter der Verfassung 
sein? (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 2008) 25; C Schmitt, Der Hüter der Verfassung (5th edn, Duncker und Humblot, 
Berlin, 2016).  
25 Cf. H Liu, ‘Carl Schmitt Redux: Law and the Political in Contemporary Global Constitutionalism’ in K Marchal 
and C Shaw (ed), Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss in the Chinese-Speaking World. Reorienting the Political 
(Lexington, London, 2017) 103. 
 
 
In his Constitutional Theory, Schmitt distinguishes between constitutions in the sense of a 
political order and written constitutional texts. He refers to the former as positive concepts of 
constitutions (positiver Verfassungsbegriff), and to the latter as relative concepts or relativer 
Verfassungsbegriff.26 In his view, then, the very notion of a constitution, even more so if we are 
to appreciate the semantic origins of the term, must denote more than the written document 
usually referred to as such.27 A positive constitution in the Schmittian sense is thus the order 
that is created through a sovereign decision. This decision – unlike the ‘formal characteristics’ 
of the constitutional law which are seen as merely ‘peripheral’ – determines the very nature of 
the state in question: 
A state does not have a constitution “according to which” its will is formed and functions, 
but rather a state is a constitution, i.e. an existential condition, a status of unity and 
order.28  
This short quotation from the Verfassungslehre – also cited by Chen Duanhong in his well-
known 2008 essay which launched the project of Chinese Political Constitutionalism – 
incorporates all elements set out above. The constitutional law or ‘relative constitution’ is but 
a legal concretization and specification of the underlying state order, which is founded on purely 
political grounds, i.e. through a process of exclusion (the infamous friend-enemy-distinction).29 
Therein lies the implication of the concept of the political in constitutional terms. Accordingly, 
Schmitt further distinguishes between the foundational ‘political’ and the superimposed ‘rule-
of-law’ (rechtsstaatlich) elements of modern-day constitutions. The latter, including individual 
rights, surely are a genuine feature of any ‘bourgeois’ state, but by no means a conceptually 
necessary element of constitutions as such.30 On the other hand, all legal documents, including 
the written document of the constitutional law itself, can only function under the premise of this 
political conditio sine qua non: ‘The concept of the state presupposes the concept of the 
political’.31  For any text to acquire legal validity and meaning, it must be based upon ‘a 
preceding political decision’.32 Hence, written constitutions are not only amendable (through 
revision) but also ‘suspendable’ (through an act of sovereign decision): 
The constitution is inviolable. The constitutional law, on the other hand, can be 
suspended during the state of exception.33 
                                                          
26 C Schmitt, Verfassungslehre (11th edn, Duncker und Humblot, Berlin, 2017) 11. 
27 Some have pointed out that Schmitt's theory in this regard merely mirrored the 'two-sided conception of 
statehood' that German scholars of public law since Georg Jellinek had come to endorse: the state as a socio-
historical entity and as a set of legal norms. See Mehring (n 13) 513; M Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of 
Nations. The Rise and Fall of   International Law 1870-1960 (CUP, Cambridge, 2001) 242. 
28 Schmitt (n 26) 4. 
29 Ibid 76. 
30 Ibid 125. 
31 Schmitt (n 14) 7 
32 Ibid 22. 
33 Schmitt (n 26) 26. 
 
 
Thus, we have seen that all three aspects outlined above are intrinsically linked and form a 
distinct conceptual line: from the foundational concept of the political which presupposes the 
existence of a state in the form of a ‘friend-enemy distinction’; via the theory of sovereignty 
giving expression to the order thus formed through sovereign decisions; to the distinction 
between constitution and constitutional law, the latter of which is but the final formalization of 
the underlying political decision. Hence, the political decision to form a nation-state is without 
any doubt the most basic element in Schmitt’s constitutional thought. However, if we were to 
isolate and decontextualize this single element, we would arrive at a vulgarized notion of what 
Schmitt meant by the political – something which is particularly evident in the Chinese Schmitt-
reception of the early years.34 A modern state founded on the sovereign decision of a people – 
this follows from Schmitt’s realist imperative – is inherently legitimate and needs no external 
justification. Schmitt infamously asserts that ‘whatever exists as a political entity is worth 
existing from the juridical point of view’. 35  Likewise, regarding the state of exception, 
Schmitt’s theory plainly evades all normative predicaments entailed by this realist imperative. 
The successful resolution of a constitutional crises is thus determined retrospectively in a purely 
factual manner – ex facto ius oritur: 
If asked what the raison d’état is when it demands a violation or removal of the existing 
law; all these questions cannot be answered normatively, but only acquire their concrete 
meaning with the concrete decision of the sovereign.36  
III. … and three corresponding ‘strategies of reception’  
Foreign depictions of the Chinese legal discourse used to be centered around substantive 
notions, most notably the debate over ‘thick’ or ‘thin’ conceptions of the rule of law.37 Whereas 
these debates served as a legitimate starting point for conceptual analysis, they were not very 
telling once a deeper understanding of the ‘internal dynamics of the Chinese rule of law 
discourse’ was required.38 This is so because substantive conceptual dichotomies as the above-
mentioned tend to obfuscate the internal diversity and degree of disagreement within the 
Chinese debate for the sake of presenting a seemingly uniform ‘Chinese’ approach to the rule 
of law. The departure from this illiberal-liberal or thin-thick-dichotomy has gone furthest in 
                                                          
34 Also see Q Zheng, Carl Schmitt, Mao Zedong and the Politics of Transition (Palgrave, Basingtoke, 2015) 13 et 
seqq. 
35 Schmitt (n 26) 22. Also see H Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (Franz Deuticke, Leipzig, 1934) 71. 
36 Schmitt (n 26) 49. 
37 See for instance R Peerenboom, ‘Fly High the Banner of Socialist Rule of Law with Chinese Characteristics! 
What does the 4th Plenum Decision Mean for Legal Reforms in China?’ (2015) 7 Hague Journal of the Rule of 
Law 49. 
38 S Seppänen, Ideological Conflict and the Rule of Law in Contemporary China: Useful Paradoxes (CUP, 
Cambridge, 2016) 1. 
 
 
Samuli Seppänen’s account of ideological conflict in the Chinese rule of law discourse. Instead 
of taking every statement made by Chinese legal scholars at face-value, he argues that:  
Ideological statements matter regardless of whether they are sincerely believed – and 
sometimes they matter because they are not sincerely believed.39 
This ‘performative turn’ shifts the focus from the truth-value of speech acts to their 
instrumental, ideological, and at times plainly contradictory or even paradoxical dimensions. 
Legal statements are thus seen as inherently ideological and rarely ever detached from their 
social and discursive context which demarcates the confines of the ‘speakable’.40 Adopting 
such a perspective, while also acknowledging its limits, thus allows us to describe the 
conflicting ways in which Schmitt is read, adopted, and redefined in Chinese discourse as forms 
of performative practices which are mirrored in the argumentative strategies analyzed below. 
We may thereby show how different ‘personae’ of Schmitt are conceived of and put to use as 
instruments of ideological positioning.41 How one positions oneself toward Schmitt, and what 
meaning one ascribes to his work within the Chinese context, also implies a take on questions 
of particular ideological pertinence. Although I acknowledge that these ascriptions are 
inherently ambiguous and elusive, applying them seems justified to the extent that they are 
deeply entrenched in the Chinese debate as well. One’s stance on Schmitt, for instance, implies 
a decision upon questions such as:42 
i) What is the position of the CCP in the legal system and vis-à-vis the judiciary? 
ii) Can the CCP suspend legal norms when she deems that politically desirable? 
iii) Is the legal sphere in general autonomous from the political? 
When encountering Schmitt’s theoretical work, one can either adopt an affirmative or hostile 
position, but hardly ever be neutral or indifferent. Therefore, we can duly call Schmitt a marker 
of ideological division lines in China’s current legal discourse. Consequently, Schmitt’s 
contested persona assumes different roles depending on whether he is cited by, say, neo-
conservative adherents or liberal adversaries. However, due to his influence on the 
contemporary Chinese debate, one almost cannot evade associating with or dissociating from 
what one early Chinese essay on Schmitt dubbed the ‘Schmittian challenge’.43  
                                                          
39 Ibid 18. 
40 For a classical study with regard to Chinese politics see M Schoenhals, Doing Things with Words in Chinese 
Politics: Five Studies (University of California China Research Monographs, Berkeley, 1992). 
41 Cf. Kroll (n 9) 106-108. 
42 Seppänen (n 38) 15. 
43 X Zhang, ‘施米特的挑战 : 读“议会民主的危机“’ [‘The Schmittian Challenge: Reading “The Crisis of 
Parliamentary Democracy”’] (2005) 2 Open Times [开放时代] 126. 
 
 
Of common enemies and faux amis: Leftist appropriations of Schmitt and their 
liberal critics 
The glaringly anti-liberal dimensions of Schmitt’s thought and its reception in China were 
addressed rather exhaustively elsewhere.44 This anti-liberal line of reception can be linked to 
several political theorists and scholars conventionally – though not unproblematically – referred 
to as the Chinese New Left. In the heyday of the Chinese discussion, their ‘strategy’ of reading 
Schmitt anti-liberally was particularly pronounced. Notable scholars include Liu Xiaofeng, who 
instigated the Chinese ‘Schmitt-fever’ with a number of articles and publications beginning in 
1998, as well as Zhang Xudong, whose 2005 article on the ‘Schmittian challenge’ for 
mainstream liberal thought was a major point of reference for liberal critics. 45  The leftist 
interpretation of Schmitt is largely based on an anti-liberal reading of Schmitt’s concept of the 
political. Professor Zhang Xudong’s 2005 essay, for instance, for the most part seems to 
selectively rely on a variety of anti-liberal statements from various works of Schmitt, without 
presenting them in their larger theoretical context. Schmitt, then, merely serves as a yet another 
source of anti-liberal criticism of ‘Western’ politics which is depicted as utterly hypocritical, 
constantly trying to conceal its power-orientation under the veil of liberal values.46 Albeit 
amounting to what Mehring referred to as a ‘metaphysically decapitated Schmittianism’, then, 
references to Schmitt’s work nonetheless serve the rather mundane purpose of ‘de-legitimizing 
the current system’.47 Conversely, scholars of the Chinese New Left seem to show little desire 
to analyze the intricacies of Schmitt’s constitutional theory. This is also why some liberal critics 
ironically refer to the Schmittianism of their fellow intellectuals as a kind of ‘take-over-ism’ 
(拿来主义).48 Many liberals have suggested that Schmitt’s highbrow language prevented a 
sober assessment of his theoretical insights, which are superficial at best.49 Some even argue 
that a Schmitt-infused nationalism historically filled the gap left behind ideologically by the 
                                                          
44 Marchal and Shaw (n 5); Shaw (n 5). 
45 Liu (n 6); Zhang (n 43); also see X Liu, ‘施米特与政治哲学的现代性‘ [‘Schmitt and the Modernity of Political 
Philosophy‘] (2001) 3 Zhejiang Academic Journal [浙江学刊] 19. 
46 Zhang (n 43) 137-138. Generously, one might call this as a ‘critical’ reading of the friend-enemy-distinction. 
Less generously, one might content that it is the vulgarization of its theoretical underpinnings. 
47 R Mehring, ‘Otto Kirchheimer und der Links-Schmittismus‘ in R Voigt (ed), Der Staat des Dezisionismus: Carl 
Schmitt in der internationalen Debatte (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2007) 60, 62. 
48 Guo (n 8) 19. 
49 Ibid 7. Also see the similar criticism in B He, ‘保卫程序: 一个自由主义者对卡尔施米特例外理论的批评’ 
[‘Defending the Procedure: A Liberal’s Critique of Carl Schmitt’s Theory of the Exception’] (2002) 2 Zhejiang 
Academic Journal [浙江学刊] 73, 79; W Chen, ‘Utterly Unreliable “Legitimacy”: A Preliminary Discussion of 
the Limits of Carl Schmitt’s Theory of Legitimacy’ [‘并不可靠的“合法性“: 试论卡尔施米特的合法性理论的
限度’] (2015) 2 Tianfu Xinlun [天府新论] 53, 58. 
 
 
demise of Marxism in the 1990s.50 Further, one recurring theme of Schmitt’s liberal critics is 
to point to his affiliation with the Nazi regime, by which one may suggest that those adopting 
his ideas must entertain similar political inclinations – or at the least profess a sense of political 
ignorance and irresponsibility.51 In response to this charge – which Zheng Qi calls the ‘strong 
critique of Schmitt’52 – some of his adherents, such as Chen Duanhong, have adopted a position 
of avowed political indifference, arguing that: 
Carl Schmitt is the most successful theorist who has introduced political theory into 
constitutional studies. We admire his constitutional theory. In terms of his personal 
political choice, that is his own business.53 
Perhaps the most intriguing and at the same time paradigmatic criticism of Schmitt’s work was 
articulated by Professor Ji Weidong, a well-known legal scholar. His criticism largely mirrors 
that of Hans Kelsen almost a century before him.54 Ji rightly points to the ambiguous nature of 
Schmitt’s definition of sovereignty. How can one ascertain the ever-elusive sovereign will, if, 
as Schmitt always maintained, the volonté général of the populace cannot be quantified in 
elections? This indicates where Ji’s criticism of Schmitt is heading: to a liberal notion of 
procedural justice.55 Without procedural rules, he insists, no democracy is feasible in practice. 
A self-proclaimed sovereign might arrive at any moment to usurp constitutional power, 
justifying his actions with appeals to a fictional sovereign authority: 
[...] Schmitt never tells us explicitly who these people are that represent the political will. 
Who determines their authority?56 
Liberal critics of Schmitt are thus fundamentally concerned with his apparent disgust for all-
inclusive and inviolable procedural rules. Just as for China’s ‘authoritarian political strongmen’, 
Ji suggests, separation of power and procedural rules were but a heap of ‘useless rubbish’ for 
Schmitt.57 For Ji, as for other critics of Schmitt, what is needed in China are procedural checks 
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within the constitutional system, not the extrapolation of sovereign decision power onto a super-
legal sovereign. He concludes that: 
Precisely when we cannot reach a consensus on substantive issues, the respective 
decision can only be regarded as legitimate when it complies with given procedural 
rules.58 
However, while most liberal-leaning scholars tend to evade the question of whether the CCP 
might be described as a sovereign in Schmitt’s sense, the possibility of such a reading might 
have, Kroll suggests, contributed to a critical self-understanding among many Chinese liberals: 
In these early years of the Sinophone debate on Schmitt, the rejection of either Schmitt’s 
critique of liberalism or its relevance for China was a way of emphasizing and 
demarcating one’s own understanding of what liberalism should mean for China.59  
Likewise, one might contend that this debate crucially contributed to the formation of a critical 
sensibility among Chinese liberal legal scholars, for some of which – like Gao Quanxi – the 
encounter with Schmitt was later described as a decisive moment of ‘political maturing’. Ji, too, 
grants a certain degree of academic value to Schmitt’s early work, especially his constitutional 
theory, albeit merely as a ‘cautionary example’. A ‘cool-headed observation’, he suggests, 
might reveal ‘blind spots and shortcomings’ of liberal constitutionalism – a recurring trope in 
the liberal discussion of Schmitt.60 
Chinese neo-conservatism and Schmitt: Embracing the exceptional 
Another rule of law paradox involves the relationship between routine order and states 
of exception, and between formal justice and substantive justice. In China, this paradox 
is especially evident in the dilemma between law-abiding and law-changing. Carl 
Schmitt’s theory about the relationship between politics, judicial order, and the national 
will strikes a sympathetic chord in many Chinese people.61 
While the early discussion of Schmitt remained largely entangled in the opposition between 
Chinese liberals and the left, things became more complex with the emergence of what I dub 
the ‘neo-conservative’ or statist strand of reception. Sebastian Veg has recently suggested that, 
following the discursive changes in China’s political debate, ‘in the 2000s the main controversy 
shifted from “liberty vs. equality” to “law vs. politics”.’62 Consequently, sovereignty versus 
constitutionalism seems to have superseded the illiberal-liberal-divide of the early 2000s as a 
new meta-debate of Chinese intellectuals, which also entailed new alliances and oppositions. 
These shifts were closely linked – though not identical – to the rise of Political 
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Constitutionalism as a scholarly agenda, which is indeed a primary example of how liberal and 
illiberal positions overlap and intersect with statists views. However, while Veg stresses the 
affinities and connections between leftist and statist thought in contemporary China,63 there are 
also differences, particularly concerning the debate about Schmitt. The neo-conservative strand 
of Political Constitutionalism – chiefly represented by Chen Duanhong and Jiang Shigong – is 
primarily concerned with defending the party-state order, and thus focuses on Schmitt’s 
constitutional theory and the notion of sovereignty. This to some extent sets them apart from 
the Schmitt-reading of the New Left which is preoccupied with his political philosophy.  
Vis-à-vis ‘orthodox’ socialist legal scholarship, on the other hand, the neo-conservative position 
differs not so much in its normative implications for the party-state or the overall political 
agenda they espouse, but rather in that they resort to methodological approaches and theoretical 
sources which transcend or reinterpret orthodox socialist ideology.64 Oftentimes, these scholars 
rely on an eclectic mélange of postmodern theorems in their normative assertions of the 
‘particular’ and ‘Chinese’. In reaction to what some perceived as the uncritical transplantation 
of non-Chinese liberal models endorsed by the text-centered jurisprudential mainstream, Neo-
Conservatives were beginning to search for counter-narratives to the gradually expanding 
autonomy of the legal sphere vis-à-vis the political. As Seppänen suggests, ‘the difference 
between conservative and mainstream scholars can be seen in their attitudes toward the 
normality of the suspension of the rule of law for extralegal considerations’.65 This sheds some 
additional light upon why Schmitt became so popular among Neo-Conservatives. The 
discrediting of statist socialist theory following the collapse of the Soviet Union is what 
facilitated and to some extent necessitated his reception in the first place. Now, undermining 
liberal theory from within constituted a ‘more subtle argument’ and attractive strategy than 
facing it on the open field of ideological struggle. 66  Under such conditions, the German 
constitutional scholar and ‘miner of the Weimar Constitution’ (Mehring) seemed to provide a 
welcome ‘toolbox’ for the raid against legal autonomy and normative methodology.  
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‘Conceptual Schmittianism’, or: Reading Schmitt against the grain 
Following the heated ideological debates described above, the work of Schmitt slowly began to 
leave its indelible mark on the conceptual underpinnings of constitutional discourse in China. 
It was only in the late 2000s that the performative positioning of the previous years slowly gave 
way to a more sustained conceptual diffusion and entrenchment of Schmittian ideas.67 This shift 
points to the complex processes of conceptual history and the migration of constitutional 
thought in the global age. As Kroll notes, this is also where we might identify the more long-
lasting impact of Schmitt on the Chinese debate, rather than in the ideological controversies 
characterizing the early years of his reception.68 In the present paper, the term ‘conceptual 
Schmittianism’ is used to denote two separate yet related phenomena. On the one hand, it refers 
to a process of unconscious diffusion by which concepts may gradually creep into a national 
discourse until their foreign origin is becoming ever-more elusive and blurred. This, I argue, 
happened to many of the dichotomies frequently employed by Schmitt, as well as much of his 
iconoclastic and biologistic language which now abounds in the literature of Political 
Constitutionalism.69 As a consequence, some of the more enduring conceptual binaries and 
discussions among Chinese constitutional lawyers can be traced back to Schmitt’s work. Prima 
facie, one might get the impression that these dichotomies merely mirror the controversy 
between normative and political methodological approaches. However, some ‘critical-liberal’ 
scholars – including respected legal theorists such as Gao Quanxi and He Xin – have also taken 
sides with a political and contextual understanding of the Chinese constitution, thus further 
complicating these distinctions.70 Their motivational drivers, however, seem to be markedly 
different from that of statists or neo-conservative scholars. The ‘critical-liberal’ perspective 
advocated by Gao Quanxi, for instance, holds that the normative mainstream position is both 
politically naïve and theoretically incapable of accounting for the constitutional reality Chinese 
scholars find themselves in. Gao arrives at this conclusion, however, through a critical and 
inverted adoption of Schmitt’s theoretical binaries. This conscious rejection of Schmitt’s 
normative implications through an inverted employment of his conceptual instruments, then, is 
the second dimension of what I call ‘conceptual Schmittianism’. As this phenomenon evidently 
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transcends the liberal-illiberal divide, it also prompts us to theorize the impact of conceptual 
diffusion on the universalizing dynamics of constitutional globalization more generally. 
IV. Reasserting the body politic: Schmitt and the emergence of Political 
Constitutionalism in China 
The emergence of Political Constitutionalism on the Chinese academic scene is a relatively 
recent phenomenon. Its origins are too complex to fully account for here. It bears noting, 
however, that its rise as an academic movement corresponded to institutional changes at the 
state and party level which were directed against the judicialization drive associated with the 
major opposing scholarly methodology – Normative Constitutionalism. These changes 
amounted to what Professor Carl Minzner famously called a ‘turn against law’. 71  On an 
ideological level, these trends where accompanied by a new state narrative critical of law as 
being unresponsive to popular needs; the circulation of an infamous ‘Document No. 9’ 
outlawing the use of certain terminology supposedly associated with Western liberalism 
(including ‘constitutionalism’);72 a sustained crackdown on human rights lawyers; and, lastly, 
a populist turn in judicial politics. Crucially, these political trends under the late Hu and current 
Xi administration also fostered a sustained state-sponsored criticism of ‘legal formalism’.73 
Somewhat simplified, then, one might say that the emergence of Political Constitutionalism in 
the pivotal year 2008 was no coincidence and part of a broader political and research agenda 
against trends toward liberalization. 
The scholars associated with Political Constitutionalism tend to imply that, from a 
programmatic point of view, the text-centered approach championed by Normative 
Constitutionalism amounts to a hidden liberal reform agenda,74 particularly a narrowly rights-
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based understanding of constitutional law. Its openly professed sympathy for the expansion of 
legal autonomy and judicial review is by some portrayed as an imposition of foreign models 
undesirable or unfeasible within the Chinese political context.75 More liberal-leaning scholars 
of Political Constitutionalism, on the other hand – while not denying the importance of such 
liberal institutions as such – contend that a normative methodology is prone to be either petty-
minded or utopian under current Chinese conditions. 76  All scholars of Political 
Constitutionalism agree, however, that, rather than being concerned with the technocratic 
particularities of constitutional interpretation, a shift of perspective toward the political 
conditions of constitutionalism was much needed in order to ‘remind the people that they are 
the master of the state and the bearer of constituent power’.77 The ‘avant-garde’ criticism of 
mainstream methodology, at the most basic level, thus implied a shift of perspective from the 
constitutional text to the political conditions under which the constitution evolves and asserts 
its normativity. In the words of Chen Duanhong, Political Constitutionalism aims at using ‘the 
political nature of the constitution to expound its normative character’ and to ‘deduce the legal 
character of the constitution from the political decision under the constituent power of the 
people’.78 The resemblance to Schmitt’s dictum that ‘the constitution’s validity is subject to the 
existing political will through which it is founded’79 is not a coincidence, as we shall see shortly.  
The most elaborate self-description of the movement can be found in an essay by Gao Quanxi.80  
His juxtaposition of the normative and political methodology reveals immediately how deeply 
the Chinese discussion is entangled in Schmittian terminology. According to Professor Gao, 
Political Constitutionalism challenges the normative mainstream in the following respects: 
Political Constitutionalism                       versus                    Normative Constitutionalism 
i)    Realism (现实主义)                                                          Utopianism (理想主义) 
ii)   Sovereignty / Constituent Power (制宪权)                      Judicial Review (违宪审查) 
iii)  State of Exception (非常时刻)                                         State of ‘Normalcy’ (平常时刻) 
iv)  Historicity (历史观) of the Constitution                          A-Historicity in Interpretation 
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v)   Contextualism (unwritten political conditions)               Textualism (written constitution) 
vi)  Organic (有机) Understanding of Law                              Mechanical Understanding of Law           
vii) Emphasis on the Preamble (序言)                                   Emphasis on Fundamental Rights 
The similarities to Schmitt are striking. Not only was he notorious for his ‘realist’ take on 
politics and rejection of idealist thinking (i)81 or his emphasis on sovereign power (ii) and the 
exceptional (iii); he also built his constitutional theory on an explicitly historical (iv) approach 
to political concepts82 and emphasized the political context (v) of adjudicative decisions and 
legal interpretation in general.83 It is also striking to note the terminological parallel regarding 
a supposedly ‘mechanical understanding of law’ and the opposing ‘organic’ approach Gao 
proposes as a remedy. In Political Theology, Schmitt famously writes that: 
In the exception, the power of real life breaks through the crust of a mechanism that has 
become torpid by repetition.84 
Just as Schmitt depicted Hans Kelsen’s normative theory of law as mechanical and ossified (vi), 
and his own thought in turn as realistic and true-to-life, Gao and others now apply this charge 
to Chinese adherents of normative constitutionalism. Lastly, in his constitutional theory, 
Schmitt explicitly emphasizes the political importance of modern constitutional preambles 
(vii).85 This was naturally read with great interest in China, where the legal effect of the 
preamble of the currently operative Constitution of 1982 was long contested.86 While in the 
past the preamble was the only place within the constitutional text where the CCP was explicitly 
mentioned, last year’s constitutional amendment has brought the ‘leadership of the party’ back 
into Article 1 of the operative text and thus largely rendered this controversy outdated. Although 
some have suggested that ‘theoretical production can serve as a kind of proxy for changes in 
the political line’, it seems exceedingly difficult to determine whether the amendment might 
reasonably be interpreted as a political victory and institutionalization of the political 
constitutionalist agenda. 87  It is safe to say, however, that the reception of Schmitt’s 
constitutional theory has provided a fertile ground for the discursive shifts that have taken place 
under the auspices of Xi Jinping, including the practical outlawry of many key liberal 
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constitutional notions and the corresponding re-merging and integration of party and state 
organs on an institutional level.88 
Chen Duanhong and the fundamental law of party leadership 
If we had to determine a singular ‘founding act’ of the Political Constitutionalist project, it 
would most likely be the publication of Professor Chen Duanhong’s 2008 essay ‘On the 
Constitution as the Fundamental Law and Highest Law of the State’. The influence of Schmitt 
on Chen is well-known in Chinese academia.89 Chen’s work is too complex to account for it in 
its entirety here. In the following, I thus want to focus primarily on Schmitt’s terminological 
and conceptual impact on Chen and show how Chen is making use of Schmitt to bolster his 
own theoretical and normative position. Chen was one of the first constitutional scholars to 
positively relate to Schmitt. Already before his well-known 2008 essay, Chen quoted Schmitt’s 
distinction between constitution and constitutional law affirmatively in one of his publications, 
stating that: ‘Every State does have a constitution, no matter whether a document referred to as 
a ‘constitution’ exists’.90 Quoting from Schmitt’s constitutional theory, he writes that: 
On a purely descriptive level, a constitution can be equated with political unity and the 
integrated status of institutions in a concrete society.91  
Against the normative mainstream in Chinese jurisprudence, Chen sought to demonstrate that 
the adherents of this methodology committed a theoretical fallacy by equating what he calls the 
‘highest law’ (高级法) – i.e. the status of the Chinese constitution as being on top of the 
normative hierarchy of the Chinese legal system – with what he refers to as the five 
‘fundamental laws’/principles (根本法) of the Chinese constitutional order, which include (in 
top-down hierarchical order): the Chinese people under the leadership of the party, socialism, 
democratic centralism, modernization through (legal-economical) construction, and 
fundamental rights. Although his discussion of the five fundamental laws is quite complex and 
goes beyond a mere reception of Schmittian notions, Schmitt’s terminology surfaces at various 
crucial points – after all, he is being cited explicitly three times in an article containing just 20 
footnotes. Chen, inter alia, utilizes Schmitt’s distinction between constitution and constitutional 
law; his idea that a constitution is based upon the legal formalization of a political order which 
is founded on a friend-enemy-distinction; the characterization of the pouvoir constituant as 
                                                          
88 Ibid 28. 
89 Cf. Z Li, ‘中国宪法学方法论反思’ [‘Reflections on the Methodological Debate in Chinese Constitutional 
Scholarship’] (2011) 2 Chinese Journal of Law [法学研究] 160, 164; Zheng (n 9). 




being an essentially unrestrainable force which manifests itself in ‘sacral moments’ (神圣时
刻),92 albeit always hovering in the background as a latent power (which, by implication, might 
provide a justification of a possible state of exception); and, lastly, his rejection of judicial 
review – again, with explicit emphasis to Schmitt’s essay on the Guardian of the Constitution. 
As it seems to be Chen’s main objective to refute the idea that China’s constitution can be 
judicialized in any meaningful way, he introduces the distinction between fundamental and 
highest law in order to show that, while the latter might be judicialized (including the 
stipulations on fundamental rights), the former cannot, since it is the expression of a factual 
political order. In this sense, the ‘derivative’ status of the Chinese constitution as the ‘highest 
law’ is but an a priori conceptualization imposed upon the factual order as expressed in the five 
‘fundamental laws’.93 It is clear that this is but a reproduction of Schmitt’s distinction between 
constitution and constitutional law in different wording.94 In a more recent publication, Chen 
further argues that any purely normative theory of constitutional validity in the line of Kelsen’s 
Grundnorm encounters insurmountable dilemmas: 
Just as Schmitt has pointed out, ‘the reason for the validity of a constitution is that it 
derives from a pouvoir constituant (a power or authority), based upon the will of which 
it is enacted.’ The endpoint for Kelsen is the starting point for Schmitt.95 
Consequently, Chen urges his readers to consider ‘using the political nature of the constitution 
to demonstrate its normativity.’ This implies conceiving of constitutions as ‘fundamental 
decisions’ of a people ‘on their future form of life’.96 The five fundamental laws, in Chen’s 
parlance, are the expression of an ‘existential law’ (生存的法), and as such of an underlying 
‘political will’ – which is also why they are not eligible for judicialization: 
Political existence is an existence of order (结构的存在), constitutional scholarship is 
a science concerning the order of political existence. Only after the order of political 
existence is transformed into that of a constitutional existence, can the political life of a 
people become regular (常态) and permanent. The transformation of the CCP from a 
revolutionary party to a party in power is in essence this transformation from political 
to constitutional order. The correct path leads from revolutionary politics (friend-
enemy-politics) to political constitutionalism (政治宪政主义), to democracy and the 
rule of law.97  
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While it is not clear whether Chen’s reference to friend-enemy-politics (敌我政治) is an 
allusion to Mao or Schmitt – or both – his characterization of constitutional scholarship as the 
study of existential orders demonstrates that he is at least reinterpreting Maoist terminology 
through a Schmittian lens. Chen makes it blatantly clear that the most important of the five 
fundamental laws is the leadership of the party – which he also refers to, again quoting Schmitt’s 
Verfassungslehre, as China’s ‘absolute constitution’ (绝对宪法): 
The so-called absolute constitution refers to the existential political status of an 
independent and self-determined people, ‘the concrete, collective condition of political 
unity and social order of a particular state’.98  
The nature of party-leadership as China’s absolute constitution also implies that a judicial 
review of party policies would manifestly violate said absolute constitution.99 Tellingly, Chen 
quotes Schmitt as the spiritus rector and major counter-voice in his discussion of the 
judicialization drive in Chinese jurisprudence: ‘The specificity of the Chinese question’, he 
reasons, ‘equals the description Schmitt once gave of Germany’, in that the conflict he described 
in his essay on Legality and Legitimacy – between a rigid normative system of rules which 
comes into open conflict with the legitimacy of the political will of the sovereign – also 
characterizes current Chinese jurisprudence.100 The reason why normativism is incapable of 
appreciating this absolute constitution of party-leadership, Chen maintains, is that it fails to 
recognize that any interpretation of China’s constitution has to follow ‘an existentialist 
philosophical conception’. 101  Chen also creatively reinterprets the Schmittian distinction 
between absolute and relative constitution in another way. If, he contends, the distinction 
between the two remains too strictly fixed, the relative constitution (read: constitutional law) 
might end up being deprived of its binding force altogether – as it indeed has during the Cultural 
Revolution. This points to the self-proclaimed mission of Political Constitutionalists of 
providing a coherent theoretical framework for party-state-relations. Since the constitutional 
text itself does not provide a solution to this problem, Chen argues, it is among the tasks of a 
constructive constitutional theory to elaborate upon it.102  
However, this refutation of both the liberal-leaning normative mainstream – which tends to 
avoid the question of party-leadership altogether – and the radical leftist vision arguing for a 
reappraisal of the Maoist past – including the Cultural Revolution – is obviously fraught with 
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tension. As noted above, Chen implicitly makes use of Schmitt’s notion of sovereignty as a 
prerogative to decide upon the state of exception, when he writes that: 
The absolute character of sovereignty is a premise of constitutionalism, and always 
remains its latent guarantee.103 
It is not at all clear – this extends to Jiang Shigong’s work as well – how the idea of a principally 
unrestrained party as the arbiter and wielder of sovereign power can be reconciled with the 
insistence on the unquestioned legitimacy of the existing order. Chen’s vision of Chinese 
constitutional scholarship as a holistic science which is giving normative validity to a factual 
political order, one could argue, is at odds with his insistence on absolute party-leadership. This 
is so because the party may very well become the driving force behind efforts to undermine the 
existing constitutional order, as it has been during Mao’s Cultural Revolution – and as it has 
again become, one might argue, with the de facto abolishment of the reform era principle of 
collective leadership in the 2018 Constitutional Amendment. I would suggest, however, that 
the antinomy resulting from these conflicting theoretical premises is not peculiar to Chen, but 
in fact merely reproduces the antinomies present in Schmitt’s work. Chen seems to be 
preemptively addressing this predicament of his theory in his discussion of what is known in 
the Chinese discussion as a ‘benevolent violation of the constitution’ (良性违宪). This theorem 
emerged out of the realization by Chinese jurists that the market reforms of the early reform 
period in the 1980s were, strictu sensu, in violation of the economic constitution at that time. 
In an effort to reconcile political desirability with legal predictability, the notion of a benevolent 
violation was thus brought forward.104 Chen attempts to rationalize the resulting antinomy – 
traditionally expressed in the Latin dictum ex iniuria ius non oritur – by arguing that the 
economic reforms were in fact a mere realization of the fourth fundamental law (i.e. economic-
legal modernization) and thus no violation at all.105  
Jiang Shigong and China’s party-state constitutionalism 
If Chen was the first prominent constitutional scholar to provide a comprehensive theoretical 
vindication of party-leadership, Jiang Shigong might be the most eloquent one to have emerged 
thus far. A professor at Peking University, Jiang has been variously described as an 
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‘internationally prominent theorist and scholar’106  and ‘the leading intellectual warrior for 
Xi’ism’.107 While there can be no doubt that Jiang has actively sought the role of a major voice 
in Chinese legal science supporting the current party-state regime; and while he has sought to 
explicitly provide theoretical justifications of legal reforms under the Xi leadership, his 
theoretical merits are contested both within and outside of China – including within the ranks 
of Chinese Political Constitutionalism itself. Schmitt’s influence on Jiang is articulated most 
clearly in an excerpt quoted by Ji Weidong. Here, Jiang writes that: 
We will never regard the constitution as only a legal document. Why? Because the 
constitution cannot guarantee itself. The constitution must be ensured by a political 
power beyond the law. In fact, this problem is precisely the focal point in the debates 
between Schmitt and Kelsen […]. As Schmitt said, the major issue of politics is to 
distinguish between ourselves and the enemy. The problem is not one of ‘freedom’ but 
one of conquering that enemy. This is the essence of politics, the essence that liberals 
always dare not face […]. Only in the critical moments of seizing state power or of life-
or-death struggle can we really understand why Schmitt detests the endless dialogue of 
political romanticists.108 
All three aspects of Schmitt’s work discussed above are utilized here by Jiang: an anti-liberal 
reading of the concept of the political, the notion of sovereignty as a political power unbound 
by law, and a concept of constitutions as being fundamentally a political decision. Just as for 
Chen, who speaks of the constitution as an ‘existential law’, for Jiang, too, it is infinitely more 
than a written document. As he puts it, a constitution is a ‘form of life’ (生活方式) and an 
existential ‘believe’ above which hovers a ‘principle of theological legitimacy’.109 Jiang and 
Chen, then, not only make use of many of Schmitt’s core theoretical tenets, they also 
appropriate his existentialist and iconoclastic language. Whereas this propensity of the Chinese 
legal ‘avant-garde’ to indulge in existentialist language and what Seppänen calls an ‘ethos of 
anti-formalism’110 is certainly worthy of further research, I want to focus here instead on the 
conceptually more trenchant underpinnings of Jiang’s theory. 
Professor Jiang’s core objective in the last decade has been to develop a theory of the complex 
integration of party and state organs through constitutional principles and conventions. He has 
done so, firstly, by systematizing a number of uncodified constitutional principles into what he 
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calls China’s unwritten constitution; secondly, he has provided an account of how this 
uncodified or unwritten constitution, with the party statute at its core, relates to and interacts 
with the written constitution of the state. This scheme of interaction includes the relation 
between the CCP’s Central Committee and the National People’s Congress (NPC) as the state’s 
highest legislative body, as well as between the party policies/statute and state laws/constitution. 
Jiang is perhaps most well-known outside China for his article on China’s unwritten 
constitution which was translated into English and published in 2010.111 While Jiang has made 
many explicit and implicit references to Schmitt in the past, in this essays he does not explicitly 
reference Schmitt. Instead, he resorts to his interpretation of the ‘uncodified’ British 
constitution to bolster his claim that, indeed, China too has an unwritten constitution which 
should be regarded as no less important than the written constitutional text itself. His references 
to sociological jurisprudence and legal pluralism have perhaps kept observers from reading his 
theory more explicitly along the lines of Schmitt. Jiang argues that, in China’s case, the 
unwritten elements of the constitution are more telling and legally significant in terms of 
describing China’s constitutional reality than the actual written text of the Constitution of 1982. 
He then goes on to identify four sources for said unwritten constitution: The Party Constitution 
(党章), Constitutional Conventions (宪法惯例), Constitutional Doctrine (宪法教义) and 
Constitutional Statutes (宪法性法律). As in the discussion of Chen above, I will not dwell on 
the intricacies of Jiang’s account but rather point out the methodological borrowings from 
Schmitt.  
Firstly, Jiang adopts Schmitt’s realist imperative. He states that ‘it is well known that Chinese 
politics does not function completely according to this written constitution – there is a wide gap 
between constitutional representation and constitutional practice’.112 Instead of attempting to 
bridge this gap by implementing what is in fact written in the constitution while neglecting 
whatever is not – the ‘mainstream agenda’ – Jiang argues that the problem in fact resides in the 
false representation of China’s political reality within its written constitution.113 A constitution, 
that is, which was ‘imposed’ on China by political pressure of an evolving transnational 
constitutionalism originating in the West.114 His assertion that ‘it can be said that modern 
history is a narrative of Western nations imposing their way of life on other nations’,115 whether 
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persuasive or not, reiterates an anti-liberal and postmodern reading of Schmitt which parts of 
the Chinese New Left have helped to foster in the early 2000s. The merits of Schmitt’s anti-
formalism for Jiang’s approach are obvious: rather than lamenting the gap between text and 
implementation, it allows him to instead criticize the ‘deviation’ of the written constitution from 
a factual constitutional reality. In this reading, it is not the party-state which is responsible for 
the failure to live up to the constitution, but rather it was the corrupting influence of a hegemonic 
Western model which forced the constitutional text to deviate from the organically-grown and 
healthy party-state structure in the first place. By implication, just as Chen, Jiang inverts the 
notion of constitutional normativity: it is not reality that diverts from normativity, but the other 
way around. 
Jiang relies on legal pluralism to justify this realist turn. As he asserts, ‘in the sea of “non-legal 
rules”, a written and codified constitution is only an isolated island’.116 However, he does not 
merely suggest that we might enrich our understanding of China’s constitutional reality by 
taking into account constitutional conventions and customs as well – rather, he implicitly asserts 
a hierarchical ranking in which the written constitutional text can merely ‘grant’ formal legality 
to the unwritten constitutional order: 
Thus, the fundamental law of China is the leadership of the CCP with multiparty 
cooperation, and it is that fundamental law which is the foundation of all of China’s 
constitutional institutions. The political function of the written constitution is to affirm 
and reinforce that fundamental law […].117   
Thus, Jiang follows Chen’s notion of party leadership as the fundamental law of the Chinese 
constitutional order, but rather than attempting to distill this principle from the written text of 
the constitution – as Chen does – Jiang extrapolates it from a set of unwritten rules which are 
nonetheless intricately related to the written document. In his framework, the sole function of 
the written constitution and the state organs established thereunder is to provide a legal form 
for the political decisions taken by party organs; its aim is to ‘embed the system […] of the 
leadership of the party […] in a legal form’.118 In a similar vein, Professor Larry Backer has 
attempted to distinguish between political and administrative powers in the Chinese 
constitutional structure, vesting the former in party organs and the latter in state organs.119 The 
connecting piece between these two legal orders is the preamble of the written constitution 
which serves as the interpretive framework from which the political meaning of the entire 
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constitutional order is deduced. 120  In a way, this politics-law-duality merely constitutes a 
consequent application of Schmitt’s distinction between positive and formal constitution onto 
the Chinese party-state.  
In his more recent writings, Jiang has further elaborated on his theory of party-state 
constitutionalism. Like Chen, he builds on Schmitt’s distinction between legislative, 
jurisdictional and administrative state, and seeks to present China as a category sui generis: a 
rule-of-law-based party-state or party-led-Rechtsstaat (政党法治国).121 For Jiang, said party-
state is best understood in constitutional terms by taking into account different normative 
documents of legal and non-legal nature, the latter including party policies (政策), guiding 
principles (方针), and political guidelines (路线). These different norms do not merely coexist 
in their plurality, but are part of a hierarchical integrity. Just as Chen resolves the tension 
between party-leadership and statutory stability in favor of the former, Jiang resolves the 
tension between normative pluralism and state integrity in favor of the latter. As he puts it:  
Pluralism is a pluralism within integrity, integrity is an integrity on top of pluralism; 
pluralism is condensed into integrity, integrity commands pluralism.122  
Integrity, in this sense, refers to the absolute primacy of party decisions for those state organs 
applying the law. Following from this, important party policies supersede statutory norms 
enacted by the state, and decisions by the Central Committee take precedence over those of the 
NPC.123 It is interesting in this regard that Jiang speaks of party norms as a system of ‘higher 
law’. He thus re-defines Chen’s term of the constitution as the highest law – explicitly 
understood in the sense of Kelsen’s Grundnorm – and applies it to the party statute instead.124  
Apart from this structural argument, which Jiang largely shares with Chen, his theory also faces 
the same charge of normative incoherence and political indifference, since he has to reconcile 
his realist-structural imperative with an iconoclastic vision of the exceptional, loosely 
understood as a driving force of historical change. Just like Chen, Jiang seeks to dissolve this 
tension into an elusive dialectic of revolution and stability. The major problem of Chinese 
constitutional law, in his view, is not the separation of party and state, but their appropriate 
interaction and counter-balancing facilitated through the medium of law and party norms.125 
Both normative orders rely on each other, as they exert different societal functions. While the 
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party statute is the codified expression of the ‘historical mission’ of the CCP and its main basis 
of legitimacy, the state constitution is the expression of a general need for legal stability. This 
seems to reproduce Schmitt’s distinction between foundational ‘political’ and derivative ‘rule 
of law’ elements in his Verfassungslehre of 1928. At the same time, these two orders express 
the quasi-metaphysical duality of historical mission and legal consolidation, future and 
presence. 126  More widely understood, then, the exceptional might be described here as a 
permanent condition of party leadership, which drives a perpetual dynamic of suspension and 
reinforcement and propels constitutional change forward. Both dimensions are seen as 
inherently legitimate by Jiang and thus have to be brought into a harmonic unity. Although the 
function of the NPC is to ‘tame the prince’, i.e. to ‘confine the power of the CCP’ and ‘to 
gradually transform the party from a “revolutionary party” to a “ruling party” and then to 
a ”constitutional party”‘,127 it seems to go without saying for Jiang and Chen that during a state 
of exception in the sense of Schmitt the political power of party organs would prevail over the 
state organs established under the written constitution. Accordingly, the written constitution is 
not only amendable but also – albeit only by implication – suspendable, since it is distinct from 
the underlying constitutional order: 
The constitution has undergone several thorough revisions, but the essential nature of 
the PRC has not changed, because the fundamental law that constitutes China has not 
changed.128  
In this respect, Jiang faces the same theoretical predicament as Chen, since he rejects a formalist 
notion of constitutional violations but does not provide any compensatory criteria for how to 
distinguish a ‘benevolent’ from a ‘malicious’ violation.129 Jiang’s alleged ‘value-free stance in 
historical and empirical research’ 130  notwithstanding – these seemingly methodological 
quarrels are more than mere tinkering with the right analytical method: they entail normative 
questions of profound importance for the legitimacy of the entire party-state order. Jiang eagerly 
joins the chorus of those arguing that the real problem of Chinese constitutional development 
is not the judicialization of fundamental rights but the delimitation of powers between party and 
state, between the unwritten and the written constitution. He is unable or unwilling, however, 
to give any viable and explicit criteria for such a delimitation of powers. How can we tell, for 
instance, unconstitutional party interference from newly arising constitutional conventions? 
This pertains to the well-known dialectics of newly emerging customary law – ex iniuria ius 
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non oritur: can new norms arise from illegality? If we follow Seppänen’s reading, part of the 
message could be that there are no such criteria, and deliberately so; that the very meaning of 
sovereignty is paradoxically to retain a vague and ambiguous space for maneuvering. 131 
Although the party is above the state and the law, Jiang argues, its legitimacy is to a large extent 
based upon the law and the constitution, which is why it cannot simply disregard them.132 The 
binding force of the Chinese Constitution, however, would then be reduced to a mere 
psychological self-restraint on part of the Chinese leadership. Despite his sophisticated 
theoretical framework, then, Jiang ultimately has to derive his entire theoretical system from 
the factum brutum of principally unrestrained party power: ex facto ius oritur. 
Gao Quanxi and the critical inversion of the Schmittian paradigm 
If Chen and Jiang are the most vocal defenders of the particularity of China’s party-state 
constitutionalism, then Gao Quanxi is the most vocal critic of it among scholars of Political 
Constitutionalism. Gao is referred to by Professor Albert Chen as the ‘leading theorist of 
political constitutionalism in China today’.133 A professor at Shanghai’s Jiaotong University 
and expert on European history of ideas, Gao has had a complex intellectual trajectory.134 
Political Constitutionalism, as he understands it, is both a descriptive and a normative theory of 
modern constitutional history.135 In his view, constitutional law in the modern sense begins with 
the establishment of a new type of political order in the form of nation-states. These founding 
moments of constitutional law – what Gao also refers to as ‘Leviathanian moments’ (利维坦
时刻) – are understood as manifestations of the revolutionary pouvoir constituent. Like Chen 
and Jiang, Gao agrees that the founding of a new state order is a creatio ex nihilo.136 He also 
agrees with Chen’s statement that constitutional politics depends on the subsequent transition 
from this revolutionary founding period to what he refers to as ‘ordinary’ or ‘regular’ politics. 
The process of transition to this state of consolidation is described by him somewhat 
paradoxically as a ‘counter-revolution which conserves the fruits of the revolution’, or a ‘rebirth 
from restauration’.137  
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Of course, before turning conservative, a creation is needed, and this creation can be 
said to be a revolution, a radical revolution; once the pouvoir constituant is realized, 
however, constitutionalism is the restriction of the revolutionary pouvoir constituant 
through the text of the constitution and the practice of constitutional institutions; this is 
why it is conservative.138 
Notably, and in contrast to Chen and Jiang, Gao denies that China has succeeded in making this 
last transition to a stable polity and remains caught in a prolonged period of transition from 
revolution and ‘exceptional politics’ to constitutionalism and regular politics.  
It is evident, at this point, that Gao adheres to an implicit historical teleology.139 The relation 
between exceptional and regular politics, for him, is not one of political preference, but the 
expression of a historical logic of progression.140 His macro-scope application of the Schmittian 
dichotomy of norm and exception leads him to the debatable assertion that every modern 
revolution by necessity leads to a constitutional counter-revolution which restrains the initial 
radicalism inherent in the founding of a new state.141 It follows from this that every modern 
Chinese revolution thus far, including that of 1949, failed to make the subsequent progression 
toward a stable form of constitutionalism. By this claim, however, he not only seems to adhere 
to a contestable teleology, he also disregards that the current Chinese constitutional 
arrangement need not be described as a prolonged transition from revolutionary radicalism to 
liberal constitutionalism. Indeed, one could content that Chinese party-state constitutionalism 
in the lines of Chen and Jiang constitutes a relatively stable arrangement and already has made 
the transition to ‘everyday politics’ – albeit an illiberal one. Also, it seems at least debatable 
that the PRC today is facing the exact same challenges as European constitutionalism did in the 
19th century.142 In Gao’s grand-historical narrative, however, China since the Opium Wars is 
caught in the Leviathan-like politics of constitution-building and has failed at bringing about a 
viable and lasting counter-revolution to conserve the fruits of this process.143 Therefore, the 
efforts of constitutional scholars must aim at breaking out of this trajectory. Gao’s rejection of 
the normative mainstream, in contrast to Jiang, follows from his belief that normativism as a 
methodology is only applicable under fully-developed constitutionalism in the sense of 
‘ordinary’ politics. Therefore, he deems the liberal quest for constitutional review of 
fundamental rights unfeasible under China’s current conditions.144 Much like Wittgenstein’s 
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famous metaphor in the Tractatus of a ladder one throws away after having climbed up on it, 
Political Constitutionalism as a methodological premise is ultimately aimed at bringing about 
its own dispensability in the future.  
Gao was one of the first Chinese scholars to take an active part in the Chinese discussion on 
Schmitt. Prima facie, Schmitt merely constitutes a cautionary example for Gao. In that sense, 
he follows the criticism of Schmitt by scholars such as Ji Weidong. Since China’s continued 
adherence to exceptional politics is part of the very problem Gao purports to resolve, Schmitt, 
in his view, inhibits rather than enables the transition that is needed in Chinese constitutionalism:  
Let us make clear that we do not lack a politics of friend-enemy-distinction. ‘Who is our enemy? 
Who is our friend? That is the primary question of any revolution’. We have known this sentence 
[of Mao] since we were children; we do not lack decisive revolutionary leaders either. The 
political power of exceptional politics has already penetrated every aspect of social life in 
modern China. […] What we need is precisely liberal equality before the law.145 
This take on Schmitt, first expressed in 2006, has however shifted subtly in the years that 
followed. The problem of Schmitt, Gao initially argued, was to solely think from the viewpoint 
of the exceptional and thus to neglect the merits of procedural elements in liberal 
constitutionalism.146 Gao’s aim, in other words, is to ultimately transcend Schmitt’s friend-
enemy-distinction through a transition to full-fledged liberal constitutionalism.147 Like Chen, 
he also draws a parallel between the constitutional debates of Weimar Germany and the current 
Chinese discourse. The early 20th century debates surrounding the German Sonderweg (德国问
题 ) are mirrored, Gao suggests, in the idea of ‘Chinese exceptionalism’ today. 148  The 
significance of Weimar for modern constitutional theory, then, resides in the fact that it was the 
classical era of contention between judicial and political constitutionalism. In Gao’s view, 
however, the failure of the former was not due to the inherent contradiction of the Republic’s 
constitutional system – as Chen asserts following Schmitt – but due to the political immaturity 
of the German bourgeoisie, who was unable to hold the various centrifugal forces of the 
Republic together and provide a viable alternative to the radicalism of both the left and the 
right. 149  If we read this as a conscious attempt of Gao at avoiding a similar disaster of 
constitutionally unrestrained politics in China, his rejection of a narrowly textual reading of the 
Chinese constitution as politically naïve gains currency. Despite having contributed important 
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conceptual innovations, Gao reasons, Schmitt ‘has overlooked that, in particular times or 
decisive political moments of establishing a constitutional order, the [operation of] the 
constitutional law in everyday politics and its mundane contents can be transformed into a 
crucial force to restrict sovereign creations.’150  
It is not surprising, then, that Gao criticizes Jiang and Chen for their uncritical appropriation of 
Schmitt. According to Gao, the authors Chen is primarily referring to – Hobbes, Rousseau, and 
Schmitt – are merely theorists of the political, but not of constitutionalism. The inherent danger 
of constitutional politics is that this transition fails and the ‘latent force’ of the pouvoir 
constituant is being perpetuated, as it is implicitly the case in the theories of Chen and Jiang. 
This transition instead requires an ‘evolutionary path from “existential law” to the “law of 
liberty”‘, as Gao puts it with reference to Chen.151 Despite admitting that he is largely in 
agreement with Chen and Jiang from a methodological perspective, therefore, Gao distances 
himself from their political views: 
In my words, the difference between us is one of “left-wing” and “right-wing” political 
constitutionalism; our differences, at a certain level, are much more pronounced than 
the differences between me and the normative and interpretation-based [school of] 
constitutionalism.152  
This not only illustrates that Political Constitutionalism should best be understood as a weak 
methodological consensus which is capable of entertaining vastly different worldviews, but also 
that the ideological rift that Schmitt has left in current Chinese constitutional debates transcends 
the methodological controversy between the normative and political approach: 
Of course, as I have pointed out repeatedly, political constitutionalism is but a problem 
awareness (问题意识) and a methodology of constitutional research. Being an academic 
movement does not imply that our understanding of the current Chinese constitutional 
system is identical […]. The problem is more complex. For instance, Chen Duanhong’s 
[account of] the five fundamental laws […] and their inherent hierarchy does exhibit a 
certain normative compatibility with the ideology of mainstream constitutional 
scholarship; the view of Jiang Shigong concerning China’s unwritten constitution does 
defend the party-state theory of orthodox constitutional scholarship from a new 
perspective; my view, on the other hand, has stressed the normativity of political 
constitutionalism from the beginning on […].153  
It is revealing to look more closely at Gao’s criticism of Chen’s and Jiang’s theoretical 
endeavors. Chen’s writings, Gao suggests, exhibit a curious duality of radicalism and 
conservatism. On the one hand, he follows Rousseau’s radically democratic vision of the 
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popular volonté general as the sole basis of legitimate constitutional politics; on the other hand, 
his vision of the five fundamental laws ‘obfuscate the development of the liberal spirit inherent 
in China’s constitution. This [inclination to] defend the existing system via constitutional theory 
is even more pronounced in Jiang Shigong’s sociological constitutionalism.’154 It goes without 
saying that the Janus-face of radical popular sovereignty and an unconditional justification of 
the existing state order also characterizes Schmitt’s work. Gao maintains that Chen is unable to 
resolve the latent tension between the notions of fundamental and highest law within his 
theoretical framework. 155  Further, by absolutizing the difference between socialist and 
capitalist constitutions through the use of Schmittian terminology, Chen unconsciously 
reproduces the friend-enemy-distinction that he purported to overcome.156 Moreover, Jiang, too, 
is mistaking when he instead turns to the distinction between written and unwritten constitution, 
since the important question is how to restrain the political and not whether this restraint is 
attained through a written document or unwritten customs.157 His final and most devastating 
judgement on Chen’s and Jiang’s work, however, is that they have completely abandoned the 
normative potential of constitutional scholarship in favor of a politics of might: 
In my view, the understanding and explication of Chen and others concerning the 
political nature of the constitution is [following] a realist vision of the political (现实主
义的政治学), it is [a form of] political authoritarianism, not political normativism. Thus, 
they heavily distort the scholarly pursuit of political legitimacy and define constitutions 
with resort to power politics or a politics of might, while completely depriving the 
political of its normative character.158 
I have indicated above that Gao’s reception of Schmitt might be called a conceptual one, since 
he adopts some of his core notions while also critically re-interpreting them. To be sure, the 
term conceptual Schmittianism could indeed be applied to Chen and Jiang as well, in the sense 
that they, too, only selectively employ Schmittian concepts in their theory of Chinese party-
state constitutionalism. Like Gao, Chen Duanhong concludes that the normative methodology 
is not inappropriate as such, but merely inapt during times of fundamental social transition.159 
The key difference, however, is a performative one, in that they employ Schmitt in an openly 
apologetic fashion, whereas Gao instead relies on an inverted reading of Schmitt for his 
normative critique of Chinese party-state constitutionalism. In my view, it seems fair to say, 
then, that Jiang and Chen go beyond a mere conceptual reception of Schmitt by endorsing some 
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of his core normative tenets, such as his quasi-metaphysical apology and sacralization of the 
factual. In Gao’s words:  
His [i.e. Chen’s] politics is the politics of Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Schmitt, it is a 
modern version of [the view that] ‘the existing is rational’ (存在即合理).160   
Chen and Jiang do not deny the importance of a normative perspective altogether. Their 
normativism, however, is fully derivative – it follows directly from and is subject to their realist 
imperative, which, in Gao’s view, deprives it of any critical capacity.161  
Nonetheless, Gao’s own theoretical outlook remains deeply entangled in Schmittian concepts. 
This is evident if we just consider Gao’s basic claims. In his historical narrative of modern 
Chinese constitutional politics, as Zheng Qi rightly noted, ‘Gao obviously absorbs Schmitt’s 
dualism between the constitution and constitutional law and that of state of exception and 
normalcy’.162 In a foundational essay on political and judicial constitutionalism, Gao implicitly 
acknowledges that he partly owes his conceptual framing to Schmitt when he states that ‘Carl 
Schmitt, although not a liberal theorist of constitutionalism, still demonstrates a deep 
understanding of modern constitutional institutions.’163 When discussing alternatives to the 
judicialization of constitutional law, Gao, like Chen, cites Schmitt’s The Guardian of the 
Constitution as the main counter-voice against constitutional review among Western 
constitutional theorists.164 Gao thus dissociates himself both from the programmatic aims of 
neo-conservative statists and from the methodological assumptions of most Chinese liberals. 
His view is essentially liberal-traditionalist or liberal-conservative, as he points out.165 On the 
one hand, he criticizes present-day liberalism, including in its Chinese form, for being blind to 
the political.166 On the other hand, as Wang Lingyun puts it, Gao drew a decisive political lesson 
from reading Schmitt that led ‘his own liberal standpoint toward “political maturity”.’167 
Perhaps, then, the most fundamental lesson of his critical-liberal reading of Schmitt is that one 
must remain aware of the political conditions under which constitutional law operates.168   
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V. Conclusion: Chinese Schmittianism and the many faces of constitutional 
globalization 
The very possibility of such a critical-liberal reading, I would suggest, once more reveals the 
Janus-faced role of Schmitt in current Chinese constitutional discourse. The various personae 
of Schmitt in contemporary China range from his status as the bête noire of liberal scholarship, 
via the romantic projections of avant-garde scholars who see in him a potentially subversive 
force and an eloquent critic of the Western liberal order, to the ‘Schmitt-informed’ realist 
imperative of the critical-liberal agenda. Notably, the clear ideological division lines which 
were so salient in the early Chinese discussion on Schmitt seem to have slowly given way in in 
the late 2000s to a more diverse treatment of him as an intellectual figure worthy of scholarly 
interest. Along with an ever-growing body of literature, this resulted in something more closely 
resembling ‘Schmitt-scholarship’ than ‘Schmitt-fever’. On the other hand, this shift from 
ideological controversy to conceptual diffusion coincided, as shown above, with a more 
thorough penetration of Schmittian terminology into the deeper layers of Chinese legal 
discourse. This in turn significantly contributed to the formation of Political Constitutionalism 
as a scholarly agenda. Another consequence is that the clear-cut ideological divisions of the 
early reception period are now becoming ever-more blurred. This led to the paradox condition 
that, while Schmitt was more and more treated as a historical figure instead of an ideological 
mask, his conceptual impact on scholarly discussions became not only more profound but also 
increasingly elusive and harder to track. 
I would further argue that this dynamic presents a paradigmatic example of how constitutional 
ideas and concepts not only ‘migrate’ across borders,169 but also how they are subsequently re-
interpreted and re-defined in ways unintended by their creators. One scholar has referred to this 
phenomenon as the ‘pliability’ and ‘plasticity’ of constitutional ideas in the process of their 
global spread. 170  If anything, the Chinese reception of Schmitt confirms this pliability 
characterizing the conceptual migration of legal ideas. On the other hand, this phenomenon is 
but a consequence of the increasingly eclectic and globalized character of Chinese Political 
Constitutionalism itself, which merges different intellectual traditions into what Seppänen calls 
an ‘anti-formalist sensibility’. This theoretical mélange not only implies a turn to historical 
analysis, a postmodern affinity for methodological pluralism, and a critical sensitivity to 
ideological questions – but also a self-conscious absorption of the iconoclastic language of the 
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20th century intellectual avant-garde. The reception of Schmitt by constitutional theorists like 
Chen Duanhong, Jiang Shigong, or Gao Quanxi represents, I would suggest, a particular 
scholarly strategy of coming to terms with the challenges posed by legal globalization in 
contemporary China. All three read Schmitt as a voice for the reassertion of China’s 
constitutional particularity in the face of a Western-led legal globalization. However, through 
their reading they arrive at radically different conclusions about China’s constitutional future. 
The resulting controversy over the right way of approaching Schmitt provides a lens through 
which we can perceive the formation, evolution, and subsequent fragmentation of Political 
Constitutionalism, and Chinese legal theory more generally, in recent decades. In this sense, 
the Chinese reception of Schmitt and the genealogy of Political Constitutionalism overlap and 
coalesce. However one chooses to assess this condition – it surely is indicative of the degree of 
the globalization of legal theory today that the contested work of a 20th century German jurist 
– who is rarely discussed in his native country anymore – now provides a conceptual frame 
through which we can interpret discursive changes in 21st century Chinese jurisprudence.  
Moreover, the Chinese Schmitt debate also sheds light on the problematic assumption of 
uniformity that still guides many discussions about Chinese legal reforms. This can also be 
witnessed regarding China’s recent constitutional amendment which, despite the leaden silence 
with which it was largely greeted in the Chinese scholarly community, has also sparked implicit 
and more open forms of contestation that call into doubt the picture of a monolithic Chinese 
discourse marching toward an officially-sanctioned notion of the rule of law. To be sure, very 
few scholars dare to openly criticize recent policy shifts under Xi’s leadership. While Chen 
Duanhong seems to have taken an affirmative position,171 Gao Quanxi was the only major 
scholar of Political Constitutionalism to question the integration of party and state organs and 
stress the importance of further increasing the power of the NPC and moving toward the 
institutionalization of judicial review. 172  As he puts it, ‘today’s task’ cannot consist in 
‘overturning the operative constitution, or adopting a new one, but in fully implementing the 
content and spirit of the current constitution’.173 On the other hand, there are certainly few 
scholars who endorse the recent amendment as openly as Jiang Shigong, who has also begun to 
elaborate a more explicitly normative theory of the Chinese model as a contender to an US-led 
legal globalization. This also implied distancing himself from Gao and others who advocate a 
                                                          
171  D Chen, ‘ 解读修宪 ’ [‘Reading the Constitutional Amendment’], 31st January 2018, available at 
<https://www.guancha.cn/ChenDuanHong/2018_01_31_445247.shtml>.  
172 Q Gao, ‘宪法的生命在于实施’ [‘The Life of the Constitution Resides in its Implementation’] (2018) 170 
Democracy and Science [民主与科学] 6, 8. 
173 Ibid 7. 
 
 
form of Chinese nationalism checked by an American-type liberalism.174 Whatever one thinks 
of the soundness of Jiang’s theoretical frame, his normative ambitions are grand:  
[...] the ‘Chinese solution’ to modernisation engineered in the Xi Jinping era clearly 
seeks to [...] create a developmental path to modernity different from that of Western 
civilisation. This means not only the end to the global political landscape of Western 
civilisation’s domination since the age of great discoveries, but also means breaking the 
global dominance of Western civilisation in the past 500 years in the cultural sense, and 
hence ushering in a new era in human civilisation.175  
For Jiang, there can be no doubt that such a new era in human civilization also requires an 
‘uncompromising struggle’ on a civilizational scale.176 In his recent theoretical turn from a 
mostly defensive vindication of the Chinese party-state against outside influences to a more 
assertive propagation of its merits on a global scale, Jiang has also begun referring to Schmitt’s 
works on international law, including his elaboration of the notions of Nomos and Großraum.177 
This follows Jiang’s long-standing effort at elaborating a grand historical narrative of Western-
led legal expansion which is about to come to an end, before likely being replaced by a Chinese 
form of legal modernity. This vision not only strikingly contrasts with Gao Quanxi’s view that 
there simply is no indigenous Chinese legal modernity to draw on or propagate;178 it also 
indicates that Chinese Political Constitutionalism, and by implication the Chinese reception of 
Carl Schmitt, has entered a new stage of confidence and assertiveness. 
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